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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LESTER DAVEY WELLARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8227 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent controverts many of the statements in 
the appellant's brief regarding the facts of this case, either 
because they relate to facts not found in the record on ap-
peal or because they are not considered accurate. The rec-
ord on appeal shows the following material facts: 
The appellant was convicted in the Third District Court 
in Salt Lake County of the crime of issuing a fictitious 
check, exhibit S-1, in violation of 76-26-7, U. C. A., 1953. 
Trial was by jury, before the Honorable A. H. Ellett, Dis-
trict Judge. 
The defendant passed exhibit S-1 at a filling station, 
presumably in Salt Lake City; and he passed the check of 
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exhibit S-4 at a motel in Nephi, Utah. Exhibit S-1 is a 
check to Cash for $12.00 on an Ogden bank, bearing the 
name Frank Adams as that of the maker. Exhibit S-4 is 
in part a check to Cash for $10.00 on a Logan bank, bearing 
the name Vaughn Pugmire as that of the maker. 
The defendant's story prior to his arrest, as related by 
Norman Hayward, was that he received exhibit S-1 from 
a man representing himself to the defendant as Frank 
Adams, a resident of Layton, Utah, in payment for some 
books he sold to said Adams in Layton in December, 1953. 
The defendant described this Frank Adams as a man 28 
to 30 years old (R. 14 line 30 to R. 18 line 5). The defen-
dant also said, prior to his arrest, that he had received the 
check part of exhibit S-4 from a Mr. Pugmire in Idaho in 
payment for some books sold to Pugmire (R. 20 line 21 
to R. 21 line 26). 
The defendant told Deputy Hayward before he was 
arrested that he thought he could locate Frank Adams, the 
maker of exhibit S-1, in Layton; however Mr. Hayward 
thought it inadvisable to send him to Layton, preferring to 
make an independent search (R. 24 lines 20-26). 
Deputy Hayward made a search for persons named 
Frank Adams in the Salt Lake area and in the Layton area 
by means of telephone directories only. He found a Frank 
Adams in Salt Lake City who was fifty-eight years old, 
and a Frank Adams, with a middle initial, in the Layton 
area. He made no search in the Ogden area (R. 27 line 27 
to R. 29 line 11). 
Frank D. Adams testified for the state that he had 
lived in Layton for sixty years and was very well acquainted 
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with people named Adams in Davis County because he had 
written a published genealogical record of the family lineage 
of Elias Adams, presumably an ancestor of the witness. 
Mr. Adams testified that there was no other Frank Adams 
in Davis County in December, 1953, nor was there at the 
time of the trial. The witness did not know the defendant, 
and had never seen him until the preliminary hearing was 
held. Mr. Adams had neither made nor signed exhibit S-1. 
To his knowledge, no Frank Adams worked or was sta-
tioned at Clearfield or Hill Field. His father formerly 
owned a farm east of Layton, but witness did not remember 
any tenants of this farm named Wellard. Mr. Adams oper-
ates a large super-market in Layton, and is well-known in 
and around Layton. 
The defendant testified in his defense, and admitted 
having and cashing both exhibit S-1 and exhibit S-4. His 
story at the trial was that a man calling himself Frank 
Adams made out exhibit S-1 in Layton in December, 1953, 
in the defendant's presence (R. 34 lines 28-30), and gave 
it to defendant in payment for a dozen books. He did not 
know this Frank Adams, and had never seen him before 
(R. 41 lines 5-7). Adams purportedly wore a mechanical 
leg brace; sold used cars in Layton; and lived east and 
north of Layton, possibly at Sahara Village (R. 35 lines 
5-17). The defendant required no identification from 
Adams before accepting the check. The defendant denied 
writing exhibit S-1. He said that he had known Frank D. 
Adams, the witness, when defendant was a boy in Layton, 
and that he was not the Frank Adams from whom defen-
dant received the check (R. 40 lines 9-18). Defendant had 
not seen Frank D. Adams since he was a boy, but he knew 
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there had been a Frank Adams in Layton. The defendant 
went to Layton prior to the trial, but had been unable to 
find any other Frank Adams than the Frank D. Adams who 'll 
testified (R. 41 lines 20-30). Defendant said at the trial 
that he got the check part of exhibit S-4 from a fellow in 
Logan who had it, and not from Vaughn Pugmire (R. 44 
line 17 to R. 45 line 6) . He admitted having been convicted 
of forgery in Nevada in 1941. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
AN ISSUE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE REC-
ORD ON APPEAL IS NOT BEFORE THIS 
COURT: 
A. THE DENIAL BELOW OF A MOTION TO 
DISMISS IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT 
WHEN THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT 
SUCH A MOTION WAS MADE, ANY REA-
SONS ADVANCED IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 
NOR A RULING ON SUCH MOTION. 
B. EVIDENCE NOT IN THE RECORD IS NOT 
BEFORE THE COURT; AND NO ISSUE AS TO 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IS 
BEFORE THIS COURT WHEN THE RECORD 
ON APPEAL DOES NOT CONTAIN ALL THE 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED BELOW. 
POINT II 
IT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE 
COURT BELOW TO GIVE INSTRUCTION SIX. 
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POINT III 
NO ERROR PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFEN-
DANT APPEARS IN INSTRUCTION SEVEN. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
ONE, REGARDING THE IDEM SONANS RULE. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED 
EXHIBIT S-4 INTO EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN ISSUE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE REC-
ORD ON APPEAL IS NOT BEFORE THIS 
COURT: 
A. THE DENIAL BELOW OF A MOTION TO 
DISMISS IS NOT BEFORE THIS COURT 
WHEN THE RECORD DOES NOT SHOW THAT 
SUCH A MOTION WAS MADE, ANY REA-
SONS ADVANCED IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 
NOR A RULING ON SUCH MOTION. 
B. EVIDENCE NOT IN THE RECORD IS NOT 
BEFORE THE COURT; AND NO ISSUE AS TO 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE IS 
BEFORE THIS COURT WHEN THE RECORD 
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ON APPEAL DOES NOT CONTAIN ALL THE 
EVIDENCE ADMITTED BELOW. 
A. The appellant complains in his Point I of the 
refusal of the trial court to grant his motion to dismiss, 
made at the close of the State's evidence. The record on 
appeal, however, does not show that the appellant made 
such a motion to the court, that he presented any reasons 
to the court which would justify dismissal, nor that the 
court ruled on the motion. The only reference to such a 
motion to be found in the record is in the third paragraph 
of appellant's "Draft of Bill of Exceptions" (R. 70), which 
is not properly a part of the record on appeal because it 
was never settled nor allowed by the trial judge. This 
document might be considered a statement of points on 
appeal, but nothing more. It is no more efficacious in sup-
plying the deficiency noted here than is the appellant's 
brief. 
It is a fundamental and well-settled rule of appellate 
procedure that all questions must be tried and determined 
by the record as certified to the appellate court. 3 Am. Jur. 
284, sec. 692. The appellate court can look only to the rec-
ord to determine what occurred in the court below. It will 
not consider an assignment of error unless the alleged error 
affirmatively appears of record. To predicate error upon 
the refusal to grant a motion, it must properly appear that 
the motion was made and ruled on. 3 Am. Jur. 210, sec. 
568; 24 C. J. S. 570, sec. 1783. 
In the absence of any showing in the record of a mo-
tion to dismiss by the defendant, his reasons in support 
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motion and the errors assigned in connection therewith is 
before this court. Consequently, appellant's Point I must 
be disregarded in this appeal. 
B. The appellant makes numerous assertions about 
the evidence in this case in connection with his assignments. 
of error, as well as in his statement of facts. Some of these 
assertions refer to evidence not found in the record at all. 
Other assertions question the sufficiency or the extent of 
the evidence introduced below. The respondent controverts 
a number of these assertions by the appellant. 
"The brief of an appellant * * * is limited to 
error appearing of record. Thus, the intimation of counsel 
in his brief on appeal cannot be taken as evidence of a fact 
not appearing on the record." 3 Am. Jur. 331, sec. 767. 
The court cannot consider evidence not in the record, and 
it is improper to make allegations regarding certain evi-
dence when that evidence is not in the record on appeal. 
The respondent asks that the court disregard all assertions 
in the appellant's brief regarding evidence which is not in 
the record. 
It appears from an entered order of the trial court 
(R. 55) that ten different witnesses testified at the trial, 
including the defendant. It appears that the transcript, 
however, contains the testimony of but four of these wit-
nesses (R. 8, R. 54). It thus appears of record that not all 
the evidence in the case is included in the record on appeal. 
It is self-evident that all of the evidence introduced below 
must be included in the record on appeal if the appellate 
court is to review the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. 
Therefore no question as to the extent or sufficiency of the 
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evidence introduced below is before this court, and it must 
be assumed on review that the evidence was sufficient in ::: 
extent and probative value to support the verdict and judg- l~f 
ment, as well as any intermediate ruling of the trial court 
involving the sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant's 
complaints of the insufficiency of the evidence must be ;:fl 
disregarded. 3 Am. Jur. 261, sec. 692, and p. 223, sec. 590; vi 
24 C. J. S. 590, sec. 1789. 
POINT II 
IT Vv AS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE 
COURT BELOW TO GIVE INSTRUCTION SIX. 
Instruction number six (R. 47 line 29 to R. 48 line 
15) was given to guide the jury in its determination of the 
question whether or not the purported maker of exhibit 
S-1 existed. 
The defendant first contends that this instruction 
should not have been given because, he asserts, there was 
no evidence of the non-existence of the purported maker 
other than that of Deputy Hayward. While it is not clear 
just what this has to do with the instruction, it seems to 
draw into question the sufficiency of the evidence as a mat-
ter of law to justify the instruction on this point. As es-
tablished in Point I, supra, no such question is before this 
court since all of the e.vidence is not in the record. The 
respondent, moreover, denies this assertion of the defen-
dant, and points to the testimony of Frank D. Adams (R. 
29 line 29 to R. 30 line 23) as further evidence of the non-
existence of the purported maker of exhibit S-1. 
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The remainder of defendant's complaints regarding 
instruction six are answered by People v. Gordon, 13 Cal. 
App. 678, 110 P. 469, 472, a prosecution for forgery on the 
theory that the purported maker was fictitious, where it 
was held proper to refuse an instruction that the non-ex-
istence of the maker must be proved beyond and to the 
exclusion of all reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty, 
and that if the jury had any reasonable doubt as to whether 
or not there was in existence anywhere in the world such 
a person as the purported maker, on the date in question, 
they must resolve the question in favor of the defendant. 
The court said that the state certainly was not required to 
prove, nor were the jury required to believe, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that there was no such person in the world 
as the purported maker of the instrument; but it was only 
necessary to show to a common certainty that there was no 
such person in existence in the vicinity of and connected 
with the particular acts charged, in the place and county 
where jurisdiction accrued. The Gordon case was approved 
and followed in People v. Reed, 84 Cal. App. 685, 258 P. 
463, 464, which was in turn followed in People v. Menne, 
4 Cal. App. 2d 91, 41 P. 2d 383, 389. The Reed and Menne 
cases were prosecutions under section 476 of the California 
Penal Code, which is the source of, and almost identical to, 
section 76-26-7, U. C. A., 1953. State v. Tinnin, 64 U. 587, 
232 P. 543, 43 A. L. R. 46. 
It is perfectly obvious that some sort of limitation 
must be placed on the necessity of proving non-existence 
under 76-26-7 or that law would be nullified, as stated in 
the Reed case cited. The defendant contends, however, that 
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Instruction six er_red in limiting the need for proof to Davis 
County when exhibit S-1 is drawn on an Ogden bank and 
was passed in Salt Lake County. To this, the respondent 
answers that the defendant himself is responsible for this 
limitation and therefore has no cause to complain. The de-
fendant represented that the purported maker of exhibit 
S-1 lived in or near Layton, both before defendant's arrest 
and at his trial. This necessarily restricted the question of 
the alleged maker's existence to the Layton area. The mat-
ter was localized and placed in issue by the defendant him-
self, and he cannot be heard to assume a different or in-
compatible position on appeal. 
Instruction six comported fully with the law and facts 
of this case. 
POINT III 
NO ERROR PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFEN-
DANT APPEARS IN INSTRUCTION SEVEN. 




committed by the trial court in giving the third paragraph J~ 
of instruction seven (R. 48 lines 23-25) because the facts 
proved at the trial did not justify-indeed, precluded-such 
an instruction. This seems to be a complaint that the ver-
dict should have been directed for the defendant on this 
point. If so, it is also apparently a complaint that the court 
failed to act on its own motion in accord with the silent 
desires of the defendant, for the record shows no motion 
by the defendant raising the point. 
The court, in instruction seven, listed the elements of 
the crime charged against the defendant, telling the jury, 
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inter alia, that in order to find the defendant guilty of the 
crime charged it would have to find that the purported 
maker of exhibit S-1 did not exist. It cannot be denied that 
paragraph three (the second element) of this instruction 
correctly stated a necessary finding to sustain a conviction 
under the statute, 76-26-7, and that is all it pretended to 
do. See State v. Jensen, 103 U. 478, 136 P. 2d 949, 953, 
where the elements of this crime are enumerated. 
Indeed, it seems clear that any error committed here 
was in favor of the defendant, as the instruction required 
the jury to find each of the elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt; and non-existence need not be shown that conclusive-
ly. People v. Gordon, 13 Cal. App. 678, 110 P. 469, 472; 
People v. Reed, 84 Cal. App. 685, 258 P. 463, 464; People 
v. Menne, 4 Cal. App. 2d 91, 41 P. 2d 383, 389. 
The court below, of course, was required to instruct the 
jury as to the law, not the facts. Should the court, how-
ever, have given this instruction "* * * in the face of 
* * *" evidence of the existence of at least one Frank 
Adams in the area involved in the case, and in the absence 
of any motions or requests by the defendant? The trial 
judge is not obliged to direct a verdict for the defendant 
on his own motion unless the questions of law and fact are 
clearly and unequivocally in favor of the defendant, if ever, 
and unless such action is required to avoid an obvious mis-
carriage of justice. The court is not obligated to conduct 
the defense of the accused. 
In People v. Terrill, 133 Cal. 120, 65 P. 303, the de-
fendant was convicted under the California equivalent of 
our section 76-26-7; and he urged, on appeal, that the evi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
dence below disclosed the existence of the person claimed 
to be fictitious. Venue was in Santa Clara county, and the 
prosecution offered evidence to show that no such man as 
Leon McAbee, the purported maker of the note in question, 
existed in that county. It appeared from the evidence that 
the purported 1naker was a male person. The defendant 
showed the existence of a married woman named Leon 
McAbee in the same county, though she apparently was 
not present at the trial. The court, nevertheless, said, 
"There is no evidence tending to show that the signature 
purported to be hers," in affirming the conviction. See 
also People v. Bernard, 21 Cal. App. 56, 130 P. 1063, and 
People v. Lucas, 67 Cal. App. 452, 227 P. 709. 
Under these cases, no prejudicial error occurred in giv-
ing instruction seven and in failing to direct this point for 
defendant on the court's own motion. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
ONE, REGARDING THE IDEM SONANS RULE. 
Defendant complains of the refusal of the trial court 
to give his requested instruction number one (R. 58). 
The request was to instruct the jury that names which 
are either identical or idem sonans presumably refer to 
identical persons, and that this presumption is rebutted by 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to the contrary. 
If for no other reason, the court below properly re-
fused to give such an instruction because no rule of law 
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would require the rebuttal beyond a reasonable doubt of 
such a presumption. Indeed, it has been held that the prima 
facie presumption of identity of person arising from the 
identity or similarity of names is liable to be shaken by the 
slightest proof of facts which produce a doubt as to identity. 
King v. Slepka, 194 Okla. 11, 146 P. 2d 1002, 1005. 
If it is assumed, solely for argument and without con-
ceding, that a proper idem sonans instruction should have 
been given, it nevertheless was not reversible error to fail 
to give it; for any presumption raised by the similarity of 
the names involved had been sufficiently rebutted by the 
defendant's own testimony by the time the trial had ended. 
Defendant testified (R. 40, lines 9 to 18) that the witness 
Frank D. Adams was not the person representing himself 
as Frank Adams who allegedly had made out the check. 
The jury could not at the same time have believed defen-
dant's testimony and also have believed that the Frank 
Adams of Exhibit S-1 and Frank D. Adams were the same 
person. Defendant cannot be heard to assert a presumption 
on appeal which is contradicted by his own direct testimony 
at the trial. This would be contrary to reason as well as 
the rule of law that an appellant will not be heard to take a 
position on appeal inconsistent with that adopted below. 
Rebuttable presumptions are usually nothing more than 
crutches used by courts as a substitute for the facts, and 
when the facts appear there is no need to use the crutch. 
Certainly it would be nonsensical to require or permit a re-
buttable presumption to oppose, or be weighed against, 
facts which clearly and unmistakably rebut that presump-
tion. 
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The defendant rebutted his own presumption, and there 
was no error committed by the court in refusing to submit 
the presumption to the jury. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED 
EXHIBIT S-4 INTO EVIDENCE. 
Exhibit S-4 consists of a check and a bank notice 
stapled together. The defendant admitted cashing the check 
in Nephi. Exhibit S-4 was admitted in evidence over the 
objection of appellant that it was immaterial and incompe-
tent (R. 22 line 10). At the time S-4 was admitted, the 
court specially instructed the jury regarding the limited 
purpose for which it could be considered (R. 22 line 30 to 
R. 23 line 24). The record reveals no objection nor excep-
tion to this special instruction, nor does it show that de-
fendant requested any additional instruction relative to this 
exhibit. 
Defendant complains of the admission of exhibit S-4 
and complains that the special instruction given at the time 
was ambiguous, confusing, and failed to define a fictitious 
check. 
The complaints regarding the instruction are made for 
the first time on appeal, and therefore, under the general 
rule, should be disregarded by this court. 3 Am. J ur. 25, 
sec. 246; 24 C. J. S. 268, sec. 1669, and p. 299, sec. 1674. 
State v. Gorham, 93 U. 274, 72 P. 2d 656, 664. The alleged 
errors, if any exist, could easily have been corrected at the 
time upon application to the trial court. 
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Moreover, the respondent finds no prejudicial error. 
It may be noted that defendant's complaint that the in-
struction was in error in requiring the jury to ignore ex-
hibit S-4 until S-1 was found to be fictitious is really a 
complaint about the order of proof permitted by the court, 
as the defendant would be the last to say that S-4 should 
have been admitted without a limiting instruction. The 
other alternatives are to exclude exhibit S-4 entirely, or 
to delay its admission until S-1 has been found fictitious. 
The order of proof is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal in the ab-
sence of a clear showing of abuse. State v. Pollock et al., 
102 U. 587, 129 P. 2d 554, 557; State v. Olson, 75 U. 583, 
287 P. 181, 185. There is, a fortiori, no requirement that 
a jury return a special verdict as to one element of a crime 
before it may consider evidence as to another element of 
the crime. See also Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed., sec. 307. 
Nor is there any rule of law which would require that the 
special instruction given contain a definition of a fictitious 
check. A definition of this term was given in the general 
instructions, and that is sufficient. Defendant fails to sus-
tain his burden on appeal regarding these complaints. 
Because the record does not contain all the evidence 
admitted below, it must be assumed that exhibit S-4 was 
properly identified, that sufficient foundation was laid for 
its reception, that it was shown to be relevant to the issue 
of intent, and that, in general, S-4 and its supporting evi-
dence were in all respects sufficient to justify its consid-
eration by the jury for the limited purpose for which it 
was admitted. See Point I-B, supra. 
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The only real question, then, presented to the court by 
defendant's Point 5 is that of the admissibility of a check 
on which the charge against him was not based and which 
tends to show the commission of a distinct offense by the 
defendant. 
Wigmore states the correct general principle to be that 
all facts affording any reasonable inference as to the act 
charged are relevant and admissible, including facts show-
ing design, motive, knowledge, intent, and so forth, where 
these matters are in issue or relevant. To this general rule 
there is the important exception that conduct tending and 
offered as evidence to show bad moral character is inad-
missible. Wigmore, op. cit., sec. 216, p. 716. The exception 
is not made because evidence of bad moral character is 
irrelevant, but rather because its prejudicial effect exceeds 
1.;: 
too far its probative value. Therefore, to protect the inno-
cent, wise policy excludes evidence offered to show bad (:: 
character. Wigmore, sec. 193, 194. As long, however, as 
evidence is not introduced to show the bad moral character 
of the defendant, but is introduced relevant to a material 
issue in the case, it comes within the general principle 
stated and is admissible. If the evidence also tends to show 
the bad moral character of the defendant, it should be lim-
ited by instruction to consideration for its legitimate pur-
pose. Wigmore, sec. 216, p. 712. He points out that this 
result is sustained also by the fundamental principle that 
admissibility for one purpose is not affected by inadmissi-
bility for another. Sec. 216, p. 716. State v. Cooper, 114 U. 
531, 201 P. 2d 764, 768. The criminality of other acts of 
defendant offered in evidence does not affect their admissi-
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bility. The test is whether or not such acts are relevant to 
an issue in the trial other than the character of the de-
fendant. Wig., sec. 305, p. 205. See also sections 300, 302, 
and 309 et seq. 
A number of the earlier Utah cases espoused the idea 
that the admissibility of evidence of other offenses is the 
exception rather than the rule. That concept, however, was 
expressly abandoned in this state by the Court in State v. 
Scott, 111 U. 9, 175 P. 2d 1016, 1021, in favor of the more 
general and cogent analysis of Wigmore as adopted by the 
Model Code of Evidence. See State v. Green, 89 U. 437, 
57 P. 2d 750, 756; State v. Nemier et al., 106 U. 307, 148 
P. 2d 327, 329; State v. Prettyman, 113 U. 36, 191 P. 2d 
142, 146; and State v. Cooper, 114 U. 531, 201 P. 2d 764, 
767. 
The rule that evidence of other offenses by the de-
fendant, if relevant, is admissible against him to show the 
intent with which he committed the act charged is too well-
established, in this and other jurisdictions, to be contro-
verted. The intent with which the present defendant passed 
exhibit S-1 was in issue at his trial. Therefore exhibit S-4 
was properly admitted and limited to this issue, its rele-
vancy being assumed as stated above. 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendant was lawfully and justly convicted by a 
jury having full possession of the facts and operating under 
instructions which erred only in favor of the defendant. 
He fails to carry his burden of showing that his trial was 
tainted by prejudicial error. 
The judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
WOODRUFF C. GWYNN, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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